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I. Introduction
Traditionally, juries had enjoyed virtually unlimited power
to construe claims under Federal Circuit decisions that held
claim construction could be a mixed question of fact and law
submissible to the jury.1 In many cases, a jury simply answered
a special verdict question of whether it found a claim infringed,
* Associate, St. Onge Steward Johnston & Reens LLC, Stamford, Connecticut.
1. See, e.g., Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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a question that must have necessarily been based upon some
construction of the claim. This claim construction, however,
was often not recorded, thus leaving nothing to inform the ap-
pellate court of the specific construction used by the jury. Per-
haps it was for this reason, combined with a perceived increase
in the number of patent infringement cases, and a feeling of
frustration on the part of the courts, that in the landmark case
of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,2 the Federal Circuit
stripped away the unfettered power of the jury. As a result of
Markman, any dispute over the proper construction of any word
or term used in a claim must be decided by a judge before the
case goes to the jury.3
Taking claim construction out of the hands of the jury and
placing it with the court has resulted in fewer cases reaching
trial, a result which the Federal Circuit may have had in mind
when it decided Markman. This is true because, in many cases,
deciding the construction of a claim is tantamount to deciding
the outcome of the case, and a significant number of cases that
would formerly have reached the jury at trial are now being ef-
fectively decided through pretrial procedures.
One of the ways trial judges have recently disposed of or
limited the questions presented to the jury in patent cases has
been to find claims invalid, or to severely limit the breadth of
claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112. These approaches represent a
major departure from traditional claim construction, and are
the subject of this paper.
II. So What Is This § 112, Paragraph 1 Thing? - The
Changing Role of § 112, Paragraph 1
The patent statutes' primary disclosure requirement, 35
U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, requires that the specification con-
tain a written description of the invention sufficient to enable
one skilled in the art to make and use the invention.4 In addi-
tion to its "written description" component, the Court of Cus-
2. 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("We therefore
settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in a case tried to a jury, the
court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of
language used in the patent claim.").
3. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001). Paragraph 1 reads:
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toms and Patent Appeals, a predecessor to the Federal Circuit,
has held that this paragraph of § 112 also has another purpose
- to show that the inventor was in possession of the claimed
invention at the time the application was filed. 5
These seemingly straightforward concepts were well under-
stood by patent practitioners, even if their application was not.
Moreover, they were typically only of concern to patent prosecu-
tors, and largely and rightfully ignored by patent litigators.
Traditionally, a § 112, paragraph 1 issue took the form of a be-
nign rejection which was easily overcome during patent prose-
cution by amending the specification to include the language
from the claim that the patent examiner thought to be overly
broad. Litigators typically did not address § 112, paragraph 1
issues in infringement opinions, and did not expect § 112, para-
graph 1 issues to arise at trial. Indeed, substantially the only
time § 112, paragraph 1 saw the inside of a courtroom was dur-
ing appeal of a rejected patent application.
In light of recent Federal Circuit opinions, this is clearly no
longer the case.
A. Surprise, Your Claim Is Invalid - Gentry Gallery and
Patent Invalidity Under § 112
In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp.,6 the Federal Cir-
cuit invalidated claims for failure to meet the written descrip-
tion requirement of § 112, paragraph 1.7 The claim in question
was directed to a sofa having side-by-side recliners, a fixed con-
sole between the recliners and control means for operating the
recliners mounted on the seat sofa sections.8 The specification
described a sofa with side-by-side recliners, a fixed console be-
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it per-
tains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.
5. See In re Application of Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (stating
that the pertinent question is as follows: "Does the specification convey clearly to
those skilled in the art, to whom it is addressed, in any way, the information that
appellants invented that specific compound?").
6. 134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
7. See id.
8. Id. at 1475.
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tween the recliners and control means for operating the
recliners mounted on the seat sofa sections on or within the con-
sole.9 The court held the claim invalid as not adequately dis-
closing the claimed invention pursuant to § 112, paragraph 1
stating: "It is a truism that a claim need not be limited to a
preferred embodiment. However, in a given case, the scope of
the right to exclude may be limited by a narrow disclosure."10
The court distinguished the present case from earlier cases
holding that the earlier cases make clear (apparently only to the
Federal Circuit) "that claims may be no broader than the sup-
porting disclosure, and therefore that a narrow disclosure will
limit claim breadth."
11
B. Or Is It? - Enter Johnson Worldwide
Gentry Gallery appears to say that if an applicant discloses
a preferred embodiment and states that the preferred embodi-
ment solves a particular problem known in the art, then a claim
is only valid if it is limited to that particular preferred embodi-
ment. We may not like this rule, and we may think it ill-ad-
vised, but at least the Federal Circuit has delineated (for once) a
clear-cut rule to guide patent drafters, right? Well, not exactly.
In Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corp.,12 in-
terpretation of the claim at issue required construction of the
term "heading."' 3 The preferred embodiment set forth in the
specification operated such that the term "heading" was defined
as the direction of the trolling motor.' 4 The alleged infringer
9. See id. at 1477-79.
10. Id. at 1479. The court also stated that "[an applicant complies with the
written description requirement 'by describing the invention, with all its claimed
limitations."' Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479 (quoting Lockwood v. American Air-
lines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
11. Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1480. The court distinguished Ethicon Endo-
Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996), which
held that "an applicant ... is generally allowed claims, when the art permits,
which cover more than the specific embodiment shown." Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d
at 1479 (quoting Ethicon, 93 F.3d at 583 n.7). In addition, the court distinguished
In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212 (C.C.P.A. 1981), which held that "an applicant
need not describe more than one embodiment of a broad claim to adequately sup-
port that claim." Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1478-79 (quoting Rasmussen, 650
F.2d at 1215).
12. 175 F.3d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
13. Id. at 993.
14. Id.
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argued, citing Gentry Gallery, that the claim would be invalid
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 for lack of an adequate writ-
ten description if read to encompass both direction of the trol-
ling motor and direction of the boat. 15 The court disagreed,
distinguishing Gentry Gallery by characterizing it as consider-
ing "the situation where the patent's disclosure makes crystal
clear that a particular (i.e., narrow) understanding of a claim
term is an 'essential element of [the inventor's] invention."' 16
C. It's Anybody's Guess - Unanswered Questions After Gentry
Gallery and Johnson Worldwide
So what is one to take from Gentry Gallery and Johnson
Worldwide? In Johnson Worldwide, the court appears to have
returned to the general proposition that claims are to be read
broadly - unless, that is, the disclosure makes "crystal clear"
that a narrow reading is an essential element of the invention. 17
How is one to interpret this "crystal clarity" standard? Is it
more stringent than the "clear and convincing" evidence stan-
dard? Less stringent than the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard? What exactly will trigger a narrow reading of the
claims? In Gentry Gallery, the court placed great weight on the
fact that the patentee had recited a particular embodiment as
meeting an object of the invention.'8 Was this the "crystal
clear" evidence of which the court spoke? Perhaps it was the
fact that the patent at issue in Gentry Gallery recited a clear
and precise description of a preferred embodiment, whereas the
patent at issue in Johnson Worldwide never precisely defined
the term "heading," thereby leaving it open to several
interpretations.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479) (alteration in original). The
court further distinguished Gentry Gallery, stating:
[T]his case is unlike Gentry Gallery, in which this court's determination that
the patent disclosure did not support a broad meaning for the disputed
claim terms was premised on clear statements in the written description
that described the location of a claim element - the "control means" - as
"the only possible location" and that variations were "outside the stated pur-
pose of the invention."
Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 993 (quoting Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479).
17. See Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 993.
18. See Gentry Gallery, 134 F.3d at 1479.
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In light of Gentry Gallery and Johnson Worldwide, a patent
practitioner may be tempted to omit a precise description of a
preferred embodiment of the invention for fear of making "crys-
tal clear" that a narrow claim interpretation was intended.
This may particularly be the case with software-related and
computer-related patents, where the invention often includes
one or more algorithms. If a specific algorithm which comprises
an element of the invention is described in detail, particularly if
it is connected with solving a problem associated with the prior
art, the practitioner may be unsure, rightfully, whether a claim
which is broad enough to cover the use of other algorithms for
the claimed element will be found invalid. The practitioner
must avoid this temptation, however, particularly when the al-
gorithm is expressed in means-plus-function language.
III. Why, You Ask? - The Requirements of § 112,
Paragraph 6
In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,19 the Su-
preme Court held invalid the functional claims at issue in the
case, asserting that they created patent rights broader than
those which would have resulted had the applicant claimed the
invention in structural terms.20 The Court found significant the
fact that the functional language occurred at the "point of
novelty."21
At least partially in response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Halliburton, Congress enacted what is now 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, paragraph 6, which clearly sanctioned the use of the
means-plus-function format, and which effectively overruled
Halliburton.22 However, § 112, paragraph 6 also sets forth re-
strictions as to how such functional limitations are to be con-
19. 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id.
22. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2001). Paragraph 6 reads:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, ma-
terial, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover
the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.
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strued: they are to be construed as covering what is disclosed in
the specification and equivalents thereof.23
A. Equivalents: Haven't I Heard That Term Before? - The
Federal Circuit's Definition of Equivalents
In determining whether an accused infringing device is an
equivalent of the device disclosed in a patent's specification, the
Federal Circuit has held, in Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke
Manufacturing Co.,24 that: "In the context of section 112, how-
ever, an equivalent results from an insubstantial change which
adds nothing of significance to the structure, material, or acts
disclosed in the patent specification." 25 In Valmont, the claims
were directed to an irrigation system having a long rotating
arm carrying a rotatable extension arm which allowed for wa-
tering the corner regions of a rectangular field, and included a
"means for controlling" the movement of the extension arm.26
The patent disclosed that control of the arm could be accom-
plished by a system which monitored the angular position of the
rotating arm, which generated signals to move the extension
arm based thereupon. 27 The accused device employed a buried
wire, which was sensed electromagnetically, to monitor position
of the arm, and to generate control signals based thereupon.2
The court found this difference to be more than insubstantial
for the purposes of § 112, paragraph 6, but did not set forth an
analysis for distinguishing substantial from insubstantial
differences. 29
In Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus-
tries, Inc.,30 the Federal Circuit suggested that the analysis of
"insubstantial differences" for § 112, paragraph 6 equivalents is
similar to function-way-result analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents. 31 However, the court pointed out that one differ-
23. Id.
24. 983 F.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
25. Id. at 1043.
26. Id. at 1040-41.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1041.
29. See Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1044.
30. 145 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
31. Id. at 1310 ("Both § 112, T 6, and the doctrine of equivalents protect the
substance of a patentee's right to exclude by preventing mere colorable differences
2002]
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ence between the two equivalents analyses is that, because of
the nature of means-plus-function clauses themselves, § 112,
paragraph 6 requires identical, not equivalent, function.32 The
court then analyzed infringement in the case by applying, es-
sentially, a modified doctrine of equivalents analysis: it ex-
amined the accused device to determine if it performs the
identical function recited in the claim, in substantially the same
way to achieve substantially the same result as the structure
recited in the specification. 33
B. So, What About Those Algorithms You Mentioned Earlier?
- § 112, Paragraph 6 Applied to Algorithms
The Federal Circuit applied these principles to a computer-
related algorithm in WMS Gaming, Inc. v. International Game
Technology.34 At issue in the case was an electronic gaming de-
vice utilizing a random number generator for selecting stop po-
sitions for a reel.35 The pertinent claim required a "means for
assigning a plurality of numbers representing said angular po-
sitions of said reel,"36 and a "means for randomly selecting one
of said plurality of assigned numbers." 37 For performing these
"means for assigning" and "means for selecting," the specifica-
tion disclosed an algorithm which assigns single numbers to
reel stop positions and selects one of these numbers.38 The ac-
cused device included an algorithm which assigns combinations
of numbers to reel stop positions, and selects one of these combi-
nations of numbers. 39 The court found that the two algorithms
were "structurally equivalent" (i.e., they operated in substan-
tially the same way to achieve substantially the same result)
or slight improvements from escaping infringement ... They do so by applying
similar analyses of insubstantiality of the differences.").
32. Id. It should be noted that other differences between equivalents under
§ 112, paragraph 6 and the doctrine of equivalents exist, but are beyond the scope
of this paper.
33. See id. at 1311.
34. 184 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating "our analysis of structural
equivalence necessarily discusses the disclosed algorithm, which includes func-
tional-type elements.").
35. See id. at 1344.
36. Id. at 1347.
37. Id. at 1349.
38. See id. at 1344.
39. WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1344.
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within the meaning of § 112, paragraph 6.40 However, the court
refused to find literal infringement because the function of the
accused algorithm was not identical to the claimed function.41
This holding, however, raises a curious issue. If, as was the
case in WMS Gaming,42 an algorithm is expressed in terms of
its function, as is typically the case, how can an algorithm ever
be found to be an equivalent within the meaning of § 112, para-
graph 6 without being exactly what is described in the specifica-
tion? Stated another way, if an algorithm is defined in terms of
its function(s), and § 112, paragraph 6 equivalents requires
identity of function, it appears that § 112, paragraph 6
equivalents would require an identical algorithm.
IV. Conclusion
One may wonder which is stricter, § 112, paragraph 6 or
§ 112, paragraph 1. There is, however, no clear answer.
In one respect, § 112, paragraph 1 appears to be stricter.
Under Gentry Gallery, it appears that a patent claim may be
held invalid if not limited to the precise embodiment disclosed
in the specification if that embodiment achieves some particular
stated objective. 43 Thus, the patent drafter should avoid stating
strict objectives unless such are absolutely necessary for patent-
ability. When objectives are stated, the patent drafter must
now carefully consider the stated objectives to assure that the
claims cannot be construed in such a way that they do not meet
the stated objective.
In another respect, § 112, paragraph 6 may be considered
stricter, particularly when the claimed invention incorporates
one or more algorithms claimed using means-plus-function lan-
guage. This is true because the Federal Circuit's decisions in-
terpreting § 112, paragraph 6 effectively limit algorithms to
40. Id. at 1352.
41. Id. (stating that "[b]ecause the WMS 400 slot machine assigns and selects
combinations of numbers rather than single numbers, it does not perform a func-
tion identical to that of claim 1 of the Telnaes patent. Accordingly, although it has
equivalent structure, the WMS 400 slot machine does not literally infringe the
claim.").
42. Id. at 1351 (stating that "our analysis of structural equivalence necessa-
rily discusses the disclosed algorithm, which includes functional-type elements.").
43. See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479-80 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
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only those precisely disclosed in the specification. 44 In this re-
gard, since such a means-plus-function claim element will be
construed as covering what is disclosed in the specification and
equivalents thereof, the patent drafter must disclose as many
embodiments as is practicable. This idea of broadly defining
the "means" portion of the claim is not new. However, when
algorithms, which are typically defined in terms of function, are
being claimed, the patent drafter must now carefully consider
the definition of the "function" portion of the claim as well. The
claimed function must literally cover every embodiment dis-
closed, as well as equivalents thereof, to obtain meaningful cov-
erage under § 112, paragraph 6.
Whichever is considered stricter, it is clear that both
paragraphs 1 and 6 of § 112 are becoming increasingly impor-
tant in patent litigation, and care must be taken during the pat-
ent drafting stage to ensure that the patent being drafted is not
the patent at issue in the next Federal Circuit landmark
decision.
44. See, e.g., WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1348.
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